The financial crisis in East Asia generated a revival of interest in the merits of financial openness.
Introduction
Market discipline is the best means the world has found to ensure that capital is well used.
-Lawrence Summers (1998) We have no evidence that it [capital account convertibility] solves any of our problems, and some reason to think that it may make them worse -Dani Rodrik (1998) The East Asian financial crisis and the consequent conditionalities laid down by the International Monetary Fund generated a heated debate between economists on the merits and demerits of having an open capital account. Since then, most of the debate has focused on short run issues and only a few have taken the effort to examine the long run effects. At the same time, the economic growth literature, which has grown exponentially in the past decade, too has devoted little or no time on examining in detail the empirical relationship between capital controls and economic growth. This is even more surprising given the fairly large corpus of literature that now exists on international trade and economic growth.Within the scarce literature, Dani Rodrik's finding that capital account openness generated no obvious benefit on long run growth, attracted considerable attention amongst policy makers and those involved in the openness debate. 1 Based on a scatter plot of a measure of capital controls and the growth rate between 1975-89, after controlling for the initial income per capita and a few other variables, he clearly showed no perceptible correlation between the two. Not surprisingly, this evoked sharp responses from others. Eichengreen (1998) accused those, who argue that today's developing countries should resist capital account liberalization of adopting a double standard. All developed countries, he noted, opened their capital accounts-a logical culmination of the process of developing a deep financial system. While there might be valid arguments for developing countries to impose capital controls as transitional measures there are none for permanently pursuing such a policy.
In defense of Rodrik, his results are in keeping with most of the preceding literature on capital controls and economic growth. Earlier, Alesina, Grilli and Milessi Feretti (1994) found, for the sample of OECD countries, that capital controls had positive but insignificant effects on economic growth.
However, their study was based on annual data and therefore reflected short run effects. Grilli and 1 See Rodrik (1998) 2 Milessi Feretti (1995) reached a similar result for the sample of developing countries based on growth over the medium run (five-year periods). The only contrary result comes from Quinn (1997) , who shows that capital account liberalization (and not openness per se) has had positive effects on economic growth.
The finding that capital controls seem to have had little or no effect on economic growth warrants further investigation. At the broadest level, capital controls can be viewed as a form of government intervention. In search of the effects of capital controls, a reasonable path to follow would be to first answer the question -what is it that allows some governments to undertake successful interventions and not others? One of the strongest messages that permeate the economic growth literature is the importance of having favorable conditions and institutions in place for successful and sustained growth. Pursuing policies that artificially boost investment rates has not been sufficient to generate consistent increases in income per capita. Further, there is increasing evidence that the direction of causality between investment and growth may be from the latter to the former. Summers' quote above notwithstanding, neither does it seem to be true that the East Asian Miracle happened because of free markets. Rather government intervention was pervasive, and in this they were aided by some of these favorable conditions. 2 In addressing the role of capital controls in economic growth, we pose the question: Is it that the effect (both direction and magnitude) of capital controls on economic growth is subject to the underlying conditions and institutions that seem to be so important? By entertaining such a hypothesis can one bring out the effects of capital controls from hiding? In this paper, we assess the role of political fragmentation in determining the effects of capital controls on economic growth. Using an index of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity as a proxy for fragmentation, we show that the lack of such heterogeneity played a significant role in complementing capital controls and allowed a number of countries to derive positive effects from controls on growth. On the other hand, countries with high degrees of heterogeneity experienced a decline in their growth rates because of controls. It is not surprising then, that earlier papers did not find any evidence of the effect of controls on growth.
Simply entering capital controls as an independent variable in a growth regression is not the best way to search for its effects.
2 See Wade (1990) for an extensive discussion. Rodrik (1995) also addresses the question of what allows governments to get interventions right. He takes the case of two countries, South Korea and Taiwan (both of which incidentally had high rates of growth but very different policies in terms of capital openness). Both these countries, he argues, grew rich not because of outward orientation but because their governments managed to engineer a significant increase in the private return to capital.
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The argument that political fragmentation can have a negative effect on capital controls is motivated by the political economy literature on rent seeking and common pool problems. A general reading of this literature suggests that for societies with a large number of distinct groups and insecure property rights, interventions generate opportunities for excessive appropriative behavior leading to inefficiencies. 3 Being a government intervention, capital controls are also prone to this problem.
If returns to investment are higher abroad, restrictions on taking capital out can create incentives for rent seeking. This may manifest itself through high black market premiums or simply resources wasted on rent seeking in order to secure shares of the limited amounts that are allowed for export.
In both cases, if the economy is characterized by a large number of competing groups the effects will be worse since these groups end up diverting resources to an unproductive task while clearly some co-operative solution would have been superior. Effectively, it leads to a tragedy of commons type of problem where each group fights to maximize its own allocation but society suffers as a whole.
In an economy with a high degree of ethnic heterogeneity one might expect this kind of a situation to materialize. Therefore, even if controls were imposed to generate domestic capital accumulation and higher growth rates, in divided societies rent seeking activities can choke any growth augmenting effects of controls. 4 The next section of this paper presents a theoretical model which shows how controls and polarization in society can interact to affect economic growth. Section 3 discusses the data and the empirical specification. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes the paper.
A model
In this section, we develop an stylized two-period political economy model which shows how an increase in the number of distinct groups in society affects the influence of capital controls on domestic production. Controls in this story are quantitative in nature. The imposition of controls thus places limits on how much can be moved abroad. In the absence of any form of controls, each group is free to move capital in or out of the economy and there is no rent seeking. However once these controls 3 For example see, Alesina and Drazen (1991) , Tornell (1996, 1999) , Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997), Svennson (2000) , Tornell and Velasco (1992) . For empirical applications see Easterly and Levine (1997) and Mauro (1995) . 4 Though not discussed here, capital controls may affect growth through a number of other channels. Dooley (1995) presents an excellent survey of the theoretical and empirical literature. Also see Edison, Klein, Ricci and Sloek (2002) and Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose (2003).
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are imposed, groups are forced to compete with each other to ensure their share of the restricted pie.
Clearly the efficient solution would be for the groups to behave in a co-operative manner and divide the pie into equal amounts. However in the absence of such a mechanism or rules to enforce it, a scramble ensues. It is assumed that the fraction extracted by each group is not costless and is a linear function of how much each group devotes to rent seeking relative to the amount spent by all groups.
Thus the imposition of controls leads to a deadweight loss in society equal to the amount spent on rent seeking and has negative effects on output. As the number of groups increase in society this problem tends to get aggravated. To keep the model simple, government policy (i.e. the degree of controls) is assumed to be exogenous and we have abstracted from the question of effectiveness of controls. The model is based upon earlier work by Tornell (1996, 1999) , Svensson (2000) and Tornell and Velasco (1992) -all of which analyse the effects of rent seeking groups on public goods and growth.
Consider a small open economy that faces a world interest rate, r * , in the absence of any capital controls, r = r * The economy's population is assumed to be L and is divided into n equal groups. For simplicity it is assumed that all groups are initially endowed with the same amount of wealth, w i = W/n, where i(= 1...n) represents a group, W represents the economy wide initial endowment. There are two factors of production in this model: private capital stock and labor. In the absence of capital controls, groups equalize returns from domestic and international investments. They first decide how much to invest domestically and how much to invest abroad. In the second stage, they consume out of their entire wage, domestic capital and foreign capital income. Group production is characterized by a standard Cobb Douglas production function:
where
n . Therefore aggregate output is
Groups maximize second period consumption based on first period investment decisions, 5 5 Since the model builds upon the assumption that competing interest groups will want to grab the maximum possible fraction of the quota, it is more convenient to view a group as an optimizing agent as well.
Capital stock in period t + 1 is equal to endowment in the period t less foreign investment, f ,
, the income from investment abroad is given by,
where s i t , is the level of savings. Before we move onto the effects of capital controls, it is convenient to solve for the optimal values of domestic and foreign investment in the absence of any such controls.
No Capital Controls
In the absence of any controls, each group solves the following maximization problem, max ln c i t+1
Undertaking relevant substitutions and solving the problem for savings in the first period, we get
This is the standard solution for a small open economy. At the aggregate level this gives us,
and,
The notation, K * , for the domestic capital stock in the absence of any controls will be useful later on. If w i > s i
Introducing Capital Controls
When the government imposes capital controls, it is assumed to be in the form of a limit on how much capital can flow in or out of the country. We assume that this is an aggregate sum of F each on inflows and outflows. 6 Since the model does not admit the possibility of two way flows, what is of interest is the direction of flows for which this control is a binding constraint. Consider the economy where there are capital outflows, i.e. W > K * . In the absence of any controls, the aggregate flow of investment abroad can be denoted by,
With the imposition of controls we have,
1−β . Therefore the greater the restrictions, the lower is F and the higher is W − F (> W − F * ). Note that in the absence of rent seeking, the effect of such a control would be to force higher domestic capital accumulation and higher GDP. Once the amount of capital that can be taken abroad is limited, each group tries to stake its claim. We assume that each group tries to extract the maximum possible given what other groups will extract. Since all groups are identical, in equilibrium, of course, all groups extract the same fraction.
However, such extractive behaviour is assumed not to be costless. The fraction of F that each group can succesively extract is a linear function of the amount that it is willing to spend on such activity relative to the sum of the total amounts that groups spend. 7 Therefore the "rent-seeking" structure is as follows: If group i spends x i t , then it captures:
To keep the analysis simple, we assume that the bribe, x i t , is a deadweight loss to society. Further, we assume that strategies are symmetric. This is a useful assumption since otherwise one needs to solve first order conditions which involve partial derivatives of the unknown strategies of the other players making the problem more complex. In equilibrium, this also means that all groups will spend equal amounts on rent seeking. For notation, this equilibrium amount will be denoted by α and the total amount spent on rent seeking activities will be denoted by D = αn. 6 The assumption of a quantitative restriction is purely one of convenience. Undoubtedly one could develop a similar story where the restriction lies not on the movement of capital per se but on currency leading to black market premiums,
etc.
7 This structure is based on Svennson (2000) Since each group takes the strategy of other groups as given, the maximization problem after relevant substitutions, now is max
Each group needs to choose x i t taking the strategy of other groups as given. This yields the following first order condition
Using the fact that in equilibrium x i t = α, D = αn and rearranging terms we get
Clearly the above expression is non linear in D and an explicit solution cannot be derived. However one can discuss some of the qualitative properties. Let
Note that the lower bound of ψ(D = 0) = There are two comparative static exercises that are of interest: the effects of changes in n and changes in F . With respect to the former, one can make the following proposition, Proposition 1 In the presence of capital controls, an increase in n, the number of competing groups, increases the total amount of resources spent on rent seeking in the economy, i.e.
∂D ∂n > 0
Proof: This follows from applying the implicit function theorem.
Using equation (6), define:
Using the implicit function theorem it is easy to show that,
Note that the total amount spent on rent seeking in the economy is αn. As n increases this number tends to increase because of the second term. On the other hand α, the amount spent on each group could move in either direction. As the number of competing groups increase, ceteris paribus, the endowment of each group must fall and this leaves less available to be spent on rent seeking. On the other hand, the "fair share" (ie F /n) of each group that can be invested abroad falls which forces them to preserve, if not increase the amount spent on rent seeking to ensure that it can continue to keep it share. Finally, the alternative available for the group is to reduce the amount spent on rent seeking and increase the amount devoted to domestic capital accumulation. However since the return on this is lower than the return abroad the force of this effect is limited. Thus the overall effect on α is unclear but because of the opposing effects on it, its value, even if it declines, it does not do so by enough to offset the earlier proportional increase in n.
To figure out the effects of changes in F , we can again use the implicit function theorem. This gives us,
The sign of this expression is ambiguous. One can try and gain some further insight by studying the movements of the curves in there is less needed and available to spend on rent seeking. However since the amount of F that can be extracted is a function of the amount of resources devoted, this creates an incentive to spend more on rent seeking. The net return from investment abroad from the view of group, i, is r * F
An increase in F , therefore raises the incentive to increase α. Of course, this is balanced by the fact that as more resources are devoted to rent seeking, the marginal product of the domestic investment increases too and thus creates a ceiling on the responsiveness of α to an increase in F . Overall the effect of a relaxation of controls on D remains unclear. One might conjecture that when the controls are high, i.e. F is low, the latter effects dominates (ie D 0 F > 0 when F is low) whereas as controls are reduced and the economy moves nearer to full capital mobility, the former effect dominates (ie
To analyse the effects of changes in capital controls and the number of groups on aggregate output, we can write the agregate production function as,
Note that the aggregate production function in the absence of controls can be written as
Its easy to see that while capital controls tends to force capital to remain domestically, it is possible that a high enough level of rent seeking can actually lead to a reduction of capital stock and output.
One can now study the effects of capital controls and ethno-linguistic heterogeneity in the economy.
From equation (11) above, one can make the following proposition, Proposition 2 In the presence of capital controls, an increase in, n, the number of competing groups, decreases output in the economy, i.e.
∂n < 0
Proof: The proof is straightforward. From equation (11), we can see that (9), so this must mean ∂Y t+1 /∂n < 0.
At the aggregate level, all that an increase in n does, is divert resources away to rent seeking and reduce the amount available for domestic capital accumulation and therefore reduces domestic output.
Using equation (11), it is easy to figure out the effects of changes in controls on output as well,
If the amount of rent seeking is insensitive to the degree of controls, ie D 0 is not large enough to reverse the sign of ∂Y /∂F ,the fact still remains that such distortions seek to lower output. Clearly, any empirical exercise that does not take into account at least some, if not all, of these issues will not adequately capture the effect of controls on output.
To understand the effect of the interaction between the number of groups and the extent of controls, one needs to look at the second order cross derivative of output on controls and the number of groups.
Differentiating the expression in equation (12) with respect to n gives us,
In order to figure out the sign of the above derivative, in addition to knowing the effects of a change in controls on rent seeking (D 0 F ), we need to know how this effect changes as the number of groups change (D 00
). Further differentiating equation (9) with respect to F , one can show that,
If ∂D/∂F > 0, i.e. liberalization increases rent seeking, then the above expression suggests that an increase in n will reduce the magnitude of this increase in rent seeking. As discussed earlier, if liberalization increased the incentive to spend on rent seeking, this was because of the fact that the pie had gotten larger. Clearly an increase in n forces each group to spend more for the same pie, reducing the net return and therefore reduces the marginal increase in resources devoted to rent seeking. On the other hand, if ∂D/∂F < 0, i.e. an increase in capital controls led to an increase in rent seeking, this was probably because it forced people to allocate resources to domestic capital accumulation whose marginal product fell with increasing controls. Under these circumstances, each group would be better off devoting some additional resources to capturing a chunk of F which yields a higher return. If n increased at the same time, this would mean that because of the direct endowment effect (reduced W/n), each group would be forced to devote less to domestic capital accumulation which already gives a lower return making it marginally more attractive to devote resources to rent seeking.
Finally to analyze the effect of capital controls, it is more convenient to define X = K * − F as the level of capital controls. Since dX/dF = −1, it is easy to verify that D 00 X,n > 0 and equation (12) can be rewritten as
This notation is convenient to analyze the effects of the interaction of controls and the number of groups on aggregate output. This also implies that the second order cross derivative (13) can be rewritten as,
Proposition 3 An increase in the number of groups, n, worsens the effect of capital controls on
Proof: This follows from equation (16) . Note that if D 0
equation (15), we can see that if D 0
Therefore, if an increase in capital controls reduces output, then an increase in the number of competing groups will worsen the negative effect on output. As long as D 0 Xt > 1, an increase in controls reduces output because of what is lost in rent seeking activities. An increase in the number of groups tends to increase the amount of rent seeking that takes place, D 0 n > 0 (from proposition (2)) thus making the situation worse. Clearly D 0 X t > 1 is a sufficient condition and not a necessary one. Even if it is not satisfied it is still possible that while an increase in controls may lead to higher output, an increase in rent seeking due to an increase in n lowers the rise in output.
Model Specification and Description of the Data
The empirical exercise seeks to answer two questions: a) Do capital controls have any effect on economic growth? b) Are these effects influenced by the degree of ethnic homogeneity in a country?
The model outlined above is a static one (though, with some exogenous technological change or adjustment costs one could obtain dynamic versions) and in keeping with that one needs an empirical specification that tries to capture transitional effects rather than steady state effects. Based on the existing practice in the growth literature, the first question is then addressed by estimating equations of the following variety
where i indexes countries, g i is the average growth rate of per capita income (GDP per capita) for the period being investigated, y i is the logarithm of the initial GDP per capita, X i is vector of other variables that are believed to affect the growth rate in transition to the steady state and C i is the capital control index. The specification here attempts at being as close as possible to Rodrik (1998) and therefore includes in X i , a schooling variable, an indicator of institutional quality, and dummy variables for East Asia, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. The list is later extended to include other variables to test for robustness.
To address the second question, based on the model above, another variable is added which is the interaction between capital controls and ethnic homogeneity: C i × E i where E i is the measure of ethnic homogeneity. To ensure that this interaction term does not proxy for ethnic homogeneity per se, E i is also added to the list of independent variables. Thus empirical specification is now,
The measure of institutional quality that is used here is from the International Country Risk Guide published annually by Political Risk Services. The variable was introduced into the literature by Knack and Keefer (1995) and has been found to be a better indicator of the impact of property rights on economic growth than measures such as revolutions, coups, assassinations, etc. Further the model in section 2 does not account for the fact that changes in the level of enforceability of property rights can lead to changes in the optimal appropriation amount. So, at least such differences should be controlled for in the empirical specification. To measure the lack of political fragmentation, we use the ethno-linguistic homogeneity (ELH) measure used here is equal to one minus the ethno- The IMF's annual publication, Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, has, since 1967, included a table that lists whether each country had in place various restrictions on exchange rates and payments on international transactions. The table also lists whether countries had restrictions on payments for capital transactions. The limitation is that this entry is completely binary. Countries are either deemed to have controls in place or they are not. 10 The obvious drawback of such data is that 8 Originally introduced in Barro and Lee (1993) , the data here is the updated version downloaded from http://www.cid.harvard.edu.
9 Though the adequacy of these trade openness indices has recently been put to doubt by Rodrik and Rodriguez (1999) . 10 Other measures of capital mobility based on offshore interest rate differentials, black market premium and deviations from covered interest rate parity exist. However these measures are more endogenous rather than an explicit indication of policy.
14 there is no indication of the degree of capital controls making it difficult to extract much information.
Further there is no way one can distinguish between various types of capital controls. For example, one cannot distinguish between controls which some may consider desirable, such as those on short-term flows and those which may not be so, such as on foreign direct investment. Finally, there is no way to distinguish between restrictions on inflows and outflows. 11 The index of capital controls that we construct is a share based on the crude measure that is available. A dummy variable is created with a country that had capital controls in place in a given year taking the value 1, and if it had no capital controls in place, taking the value 0. Then for the period of study , the capital control index is calculated by dividing the number of years it had controls in place by the length of that period. This is, in principle, the same measure constructed by Rodrik (1999) and Klein and Olivei (1999) . In order to maximize the number of countries in the sample, any country that has a dummy variable for more than 16 years (80%) was included. Clearly this is an imperfect measure of capital controls but seemingly one of the few options that are available.
In the rest of the paper this index is referred to as CAPCON1.
In order to corroborate the results, we also used a similar variable published by the Fraser Institute and Exchange Restrictions (various issues). When foreign currency bank accounts were permissible 11 More recent issues of the same publication, beginning from 1996, carry a more disaggregated analysis of restrictions on capital transactions. While empirical analysis with the newer data set has begun to appear (see Johnston and Tamirisia (1998)), the span is much too short for any long run study. 12 See Gwartney, Lawson and Samida (2000).
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without restrictions both domestically and abroad, the rating was 10. When these accounts were restricted, the rating was zero. If foreign currency bank accounts were permissible domestically but not allowed abroad (or vice versa), the rating is 5. The data for this index is available quinquennially beginning from 1970. However there is a jump in the sample size from 1975 onwards. Though the index is not a considerable improvement over the share variable, nevertheless we used it to reconfirm the results. In the rest of the paper this index is labelled CAPCON2.
It is instructive to note how both CAPCON1 and CAPCON2 have behaved over the past decades.
Out of a total of 111 countries, only 17 had no capital controls at all during 1976-80 as measured by CAPCON1. There were as many as 87 countries with a CAPCON1 value of 1 during the same period. 
Growth Regressions
The correlation between the growth rate for the period 1975-95 and the capital controls indices are -0.30 for CAPCON1 (based on the maximum sample of 82 countries used in this study) and -0.25 for CAPCON2 (based on a maximum sample of 82 countries). Though not particularly high they are indicative of some degree of a negative association. A simple regression of the growth rate on CAPCON1 after controlling for the initial income per capita produces a coefficient of -1.11-statistically significant at the 10% level. CAPCON2 also has a negative sign but the coefficient is not significant.
In Table 2 , results similar to the regression carried out by Rodrik are presented. Columns (3) and (4) reproduce the results using the same specification for all countries. The independent variables include the log of initial GDP per capita, average years of secondary schooling for the period 1975-95 (SYR7595), the Knack and Keefer (1995) institutional quality measure (INSTTN) and regional dummies for East Asia, Latin America and Sub Saharan Africa. Columns (5) and (6) repeat the results with only non-OECD countries included in the sample. If there is any influence of capital controls on economic growth, it is not apparent here. In fact in the regressions that include all countries, it is the only variable that is not of any importance. 13 As argued in section 2, the effects of capital controls on economic growth is a negative function of the number of appropriative groups that exist in society. The index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization popularized by Easterly and Levine (1997) is one rough measure of such division in society. Of course, it is not a sufficient measure of such groupism. It is possible that countries may have high degrees of ethnic plurality and yet be more unified than countries which are ethnically homogenous. However given that this is the only measure that has been shown empirically to have a significant negative effect on economic growth, it is the one we adopt. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3 (5) and (6) clearly suggest that two countries are not driving the results. In addition to the CAPCON variables, the model in the earlier sections suggests that the interaction term should be significant. Indeed, in each of the results in Table 3 where it has been included, it is strongly significant.
A cursory look at the coefficients of CAPCON1 (and CAPCON2) and the respective interaction terms suggest that within countries that imposed complete capital controls, those with complete ethnic homogeneity (ELH=1) were in a position to offset the negative effects of capital controls. For example, a country with complete homogeneity could move from complete openness to being completely closed and experience an absolute increase of 0.78% in its annual growth rate. Alternatively, if a country that was completely heterogenous (ELH=0) 13 The OECD countries for this paper are the "older" set and do not include newer members such as Mexico and Korea. Table 4 . Again Capital Controls has a significant negative effect while the interaction term has a significant positive effect on growth.
Since Levine and Renelt (1992) , there has been a growing awareness of the problem of robustness of growth regressions. Table 3 already included a fair number of important variables against which many so called determinants of growth fail. In particular continental dummies tend to reduce the 14 A similar pattern is observed when the scatterplot exercise is repeated for CAPCON2. is not affected by these variables. Table 4 present some further robustness results. For all these regressions the gang of four was dropped to rule out their role in driving the results. In columns (3) and (4) we add a whole bunch of control variables-the log of the investment rate, the inflation rate, initial life expectancy, a measure of trade, and two interaction terms: between homogeneity and a) initial log gdp per capita and b) institutional quality. The first variable in the list is the log of the investment ratio. This variable is one of the few that is consistently significant in the multitude of growth regressions that now exist in the literature. The inflation rate is included simply as an indicator of the macroeconomic siuation in the country, while the life expectancy variable is included as an indicator of non educational human capital. Further, the latter was one of the few variables found consistently robust in the million regressions run in Sala-i-Martin (1997). We also include a a measure of openness in international trade-the volume of exports plus imports as a share of output (TRADEVOL) for the 1975-95 . CAPCON1 and the volume of trade index have a negative correlation of -0.28 for the sample of countries for which data is available. Further the latter index has a positive correlation of similar magnitude with the growth rate.
As argued earlier, the importance of ethno-linguistic homogeneity in growth might itself be a function of the level of development. At higher levels of development homogeneity might be less important. Further capital controls itself might be a negatively correlated with the growth of income per capita. Under such circumstances it is possible that the interaction between capital controls and homogeneity is really a measure of the interaction between income per capita and homogeneity.
Another problem is the correlation between capital controls and institutional quality. Most of the countries that seem to have suffered due to controls also rank low in terms of institutional quality.
This suggests that capital controls might be acting as a proxy for bad institutional quality. In fact,
Easterly (2000) suggests that ethnic fragmentation might be less of a problem in economies with better institutions. To address these issues, we also added interaction terms between homogeneity and a)
income per capita and b) institutional quality. Despite adding all these control variables, both the interaction term and the capital controls variable have significant effects. Columns 5 & 6 drop all OECD countries in addition to the East Asian tigers. Though the sample size falls drastically, the results are still very strong. 15 All these results suggest convincingly that indeed having an ethnically heterogenous society may have actually led capital controls to have adverse effects on economic growth. There are issues of endogeneity that we have not considered here. However, that is less likely to be a problem. One reason the whole exercise was undertaken was because of the observation that growth and capital controls do not have a direct significant correlation. Therefore the notion that capital controls were less in countries with higher growth rates is not a relationship that should pose a problem for the inferences arrived at here. Ethno-linguistic division is also one of the few variables that can legitimately be considered exogenous in growth regressions. 16 Table 5 lists some additional robustness results. Capital controls themselves might be negatively correlated with ethnic homogeneity. In that case, it is quite possible the interaction term in all of the earlier regressions is really picking up the non linear effect of homogeneity. Columns (1) and (2) CAPCON1 and dropping all OECD countries for each of the results displayed. These are all available upon request. 16 However some additional estimation exercises were performed using lagged values of restrictions on current account and capital account as instruments. Klein and Olivei (1999) also suggest the use of a regrouping of continental dummies as instruments for controls. The results with all these instruments continued to be robust.
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for controls. 17 Of course, BMP is more endogenous and might reflect more than just capital controlsit may reflect bad macroeconomic conditions or even trade distortions rather than capital controls. In column (3) we substitute BMP as the capital control variable. The average of the inflation rate is also added to control for other macroeconomic factors. The results are similar in spirit to the ones found earlier though the interaction term is significant only at the 10% level. In column (4) we added the trade share measure used earlier and now the interaction term, while still positive, is not signifcant at the 10% level-which is not surprising.
In addition to ethnic homogeneity, high levels of human capital stock relative to income can also be expected to help government interventions, including capital controls, work better. High levels of human capital imply the availability of a skilled labor force that allows the formation of a competent bureaucracy. In addition to looking at the effects of ethnic heterogeneity, we test for the roles of human capital in influencing the effect of capital controls on growth. As seen in columns (5) and (6), compared to the effects of ethnic homogeneity, the benefits of having high levels of human capital seem to be less significant. Of course, these findings could be a consequence of the well known problem that formal measures of human capital do not adequately reflect the true stock of human capital in an economy.
Finally, ethno-linguistic diversity is just one indicator of political fragmentation though undoubtedly a widely available and clearly exogenous one. To check for robustness, we used two alternative measures of political fragmentation examined earlier by Stein, Talvi and Grisanti (1999) . These measures are the "number of effective parties" (EFEC) and the logarithm of "district magnitude" (LDM).
The former is is a weighted average of the number of parties in the legislature where each party is weighed by its share of votes in the legislature. The latter measures the average number of representatives elected per district. Stein et. al. (1999) showed that for Latin American countries, higher values of either variable are associated with larger governments, larger deficits, and a more procyclical response to the business cycle. 18 The variables are however available only for OECD and Latin American countries and that too for the period 1991-95. Moreover, the countries that exhibit the highest fragmentation tend to be OECD countries. This clearly creates a problem since the motivation for this paper rests implicitly, to some degree, on the inability of countries to have good enough institutional arrangements to prevent excessive rent seeking. To partially address this problem both measures of political fragmentation were adjusted for institutional quality using the ICRG measure-a strategy similar to that in Lane and Tornell (1996) . 19 Despite all these limitations, it's worthwhile to check if these variables come close to replicating the results derived using ethno-linguistic homogeneity. Table   6 lists the regression results. Since the sample size falls to 35 countries, we removed the schooling variable (which was not significant in earlier runs). While the results are not as strong as those with ethno-linguistic fractionalization, they are still significant and reinforce the arguments being put forth in this research. In general, capital controls can have a positive effect on growth. However, the greater the political fragmentation, the lower the benefits from capital controls. 20 
Conclusion
Existing empirical research suggests no significant relationship between capital account liberalization and economic growth. This has led to questioning the usefulness of opening the capital account. This paper shows that on deeper examination, capital controls do have an important effect on economic growth. As with any other government intervention the success or failure of capital controls depends crucially on some underlying factors. One such important condition turns out to be the level of ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity in society to that extent that it might proxy for a measure of the the number of interest groups in society. Depending on a country's degree of heterogeneity, capital controls can have negative or positive effects. For countries with high degrees of heterogeneity, capital controls leads to greater inefficiencies and lower economic growth. It is not therefore surprising that many economists and policy makers oppose controls because they tend to promote rent-seeking. At the same time, for countries which did not have such heterogeneity, it was shown that capital controls worked to enhance economic growth. On balance, it turns out that within the sample of non OECD countries which were used for estimation and which had some capital controls in place, as many as 39 had a net negative effect of capital controls on growth and only 18 had a net positive effect. If one uses the coefficients estimated in Table 3 and applies them to countries that could not be used for estimation but for which data on capital controls and ethno-linguistic homogeneity are available, the division becomes even more unbalanced. Another 32 non OECD countries experienced a net negative 19 The maximum value of the ICRG index is 10. Therefore each of the two variables was multiplied by (10-ICRG).
Lane and Tornell (1996) adopt a similar strategy though they instead multiply their variable of interest with a dummy variable for ICRG. In their work, countries with an above median value of ICRG are assigned a value of 1 and the rest, 0. 20 Note that in this table the interaction term is capital controls interacted with political fragmentation whereas in earlier tables we interacted capital controls with ethnic homogeneity. This causes the reversal of signs of coefficients of both the interaction variable and the capital controls variable when compared to earlier tables.
effect from capital controls taking the total number of countries with a net negative effect to 71 (out of 99). 21 These findings imply that one needs to take a more nuanced view of the way policies tend to work instead of expecting to find a direct negative or positive effect. The inferences are all the more interesting given the fact that the data that was used provided fairly limited information. 
